A Minimally Decent Philosophical Method? Analytic Philosophy and Feminism

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This essay focuses on the extent to which the methods of analytic philosophy can be useful to feminist philosophers. I pose nine general questions feminist philosophers might ask to determine the suitability of a philosophical method. Examples include: Do its typical ways of formulating problems or issues encourage the inclusion of a wide variety of women's points of view? Are its central concepts gender-biased, not merely in their origin, but in very deep, continuing ways? Does it facilitate uncovering roles that gender, politics, power, and social context play in philosophy as well as in other facets of life?

Philosophers often disagree deeply. Feminists often disagree deeply. It should come as no surprise that feminist philosophers also disagree deeply. For any philosophical tradition we can name, some feminist philosopher has found pernicious androcentrism in it, or at least in some of its renowned practitioners. At the same time, some other feminist philosopher has argued for the usefulness of that tradition (purged of its pernicious elements) for women or for feminists.

Because the analytic tradition has been dominant in the English-speaking philosophical world during the formative years of academic feminist philosophy, I and many other feminist philosophers were trained in it. As the tradition to which we are closest, it is what we vehemently attack, vehemently defend, or rest with uneasily. Although my generalized irreverence has led others to see me as a critic of analytic philosophy, I am actually a troubled fence-sitter. I see the merits of the critiques and am mildly obsessed with having "clean tools," yet I feel more comfortable with the analytic style and formulation of philosophical issues than with any other prefeminist philosophical tradition. I assume that analytic philosophy influences me in many ways of which I am

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unaware. Also mindful of the many other current critiques of the analytic tradition coming from nonfeminist quarters as well, I muse that analytic philosophy might do me the favor of crumbling under its own weight before I have to make up my mind about it. Alas, since it perseveres, I wrote this essay hoping to put my mind at rest.

In order to take a fresh look at the relation between feminist philosophy and analytic philosophy, I start by asking nine questions to focus on what feminists want and need in any philosophical method. Then, after specifying the sense in which there still is "analytic philosophy," I review some examples of feminist controversy over it. Next, I return to the nine questions about method to consider the possible usefulness of analytic philosophy. Finally, I comment briefly on feminists as analytic philosophers.

WHAT DO FEMINIST PHILOSOPHERS WANT AND NEED?

In general, feminist philosophers need a philosophical method or methods that can facilitate taking seriously the full diversity of women. Such a method needs to be compatible with feminists' various formulations of their goals (be it the liberation of all women, the ending of oppression or subordination of women, a multifocal elimination of the biases of gender, race, class, and sexual orientation, or some other formulation). It needs to give feminists ways of proceeding, structure, and assistance, but be able to "get out of the way" when it can't be of help.

Below are nine questions feminists might ask about philosophical methods to determine their suitability.[1]

1. Do its goals or objectives (whether truth, understanding, clarity, enlightenment, uncovering the structure of things or experience, or something else) tend to reinforce the current values of a society, even if oppressive to women and other marginalized groups, or do they lend themselves to the possibility of social change?

2. Do its recommended or typical ways of formulating problems or issues, asking questions, and setting forth theories encourage the inclusion of a wide variety of women's points of view? For example, can women's various interests or experiences guide the choice of questions one asks about knowledge, language, or morality?

3. Are its strategies for answering its questions, solving its problems, and supporting its theories compatible with the vast array of styles of learning, of justification, and of decision making?

4. Are its central concepts and assumptions gender-biased, not merely in their origin, but in very deep, continuing ways?

5. Does it allow various kinds of people, especially women and others who have been subordinated or marginalized in academia, to be recognized authorities?

6. Can it be of assistance in evaluating feminist-motivated research?

7. Does it facilitate uncovering roles that gender, politics, power, and social context play in philosophy as well as in other facets of life?

8. Does it provide adequate grounds for intersubjective agreement concerning feminist-motivated knowledge claims and progress in feminist politics?

9. Are its criteria for success and failure appropriate for feminist goals?

I can hear the first response: no prefeminist philosophical method could possibly pass these test questions! Think of the failings of current candidates, not only the analytic tradition but also the many varieties of pragmatism, Marxism, poststructuralism, and so on. Must not the work of feminists be done afresh, critiquing tired old methods by looking at diverse women's lives and experiences?

Of course, feminist philosophers must go beyond previous methods. We criticize and even reject methods, but I assume that we need *some* philosophical method(s) and that we cannot start from scratch. In evaluating existing philosophical methods, we need to avoid a simple "pass/fail" standard. In addition, despite any analytically trained yearnings for necessary and sufficient conditions for adequacy, we should give up that model here. Instead, let us think in terms of a range of evaluations from "overtly oppressive" through "minimally decent" to "the best around." There will be many shades of gray. Hoping to avoid extensive comparative judgments among methods, I concentrate on the level of minimal decency. Yet even at this level there is some comparison needed, for sometimes the best we can say about a method is "pretty bad, but no worse than the others."

A minimally decent philosophical method is one that a feminist need not fight with in order to say what she wants to say; it does not hinder her, even if it cannot always be of help. And despite its androcentric origin, she need not be embarrassed or feel guilty about using it, for in its current form its perniciously androcentric elements can be eliminated by careful feminist attention. (But note well that much careful feminist attention will be required.)

ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY?

Before considering whether analytic philosophy provides a minimally decent method for feminists, I want to address the belief that analytic philosophy is not to be found today, that even Anglo-American philosophy is "postanalytic." If this were true, then it would indeed be strange that feminist philosophers—those who should be among the most forward-looking—would worry about whether to use a dead method. But, of course, this is too fast. (As an aside I cannot help noting that "post" is at least as frequently found preceding "feminist" as it is preceding "analytic." Who is in such a hurry to finish us both off?)

To say that analytic philosophy is misguided or has outlived its usefulness is not to deny its existence entirely. Consider Richard Rorty's critique of modern philosophy and analytic philosophy. He draws on not only Heidegger, Dewey, and Wittgenstein but also philosophers often still deemed "analytic"—Quine, Sellars, Davidson, Putnam, and others. Although Rorty believes that the central assumptions of analytic philosophy have been shown to be misguided by analytic practitioners themselves and that analytic philosophy's days of Kuhnian disciplinary "normality" are over, he does not deny that analytic philosophy still exists. It has "only a stylistic and sociological unity" (Rorty 1982, 217). Analytic philosophers don't subscribe to a set of common doctrines; instead, they value clarity in writing style and rigor in argument, specifically (for Rorty) the ability to construct or criticize any argument regardless of its substance. Call this the "clear and rigorous tools" view.

The other component of the "clear and rigorous tools" view of analytic philosophy concerns whom we consider our philosophical ancestors and whom we read now. For style and tools aren't enough. If a renegade poststructuralist decided to write with the kind of clarity we expect of analytic philosophers (even overqualifying each point!), she would not thereby be analytic. Or if even the idea of such a person is too far-fetched, imagine a Dewey-and-James-quoting pragmatist writing and arguing in an analytic style. These philosophers won't do as analytic, not necessarily because of clear doctrinal differences, but because "analytic philosophy" is also a matter of history. It is the philosophy that has prevailed in English-speaking countries for most of the twentieth century, starting with Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Moore, and including the logical positivists, ordinary language philosophers, postpositivists, and their myriad successors.[2] If we stop here, short of trying to find any common doctrines among them to which a bearer of the title "analytic philosopher" must subscribe, we have the "clear and rigorous tools with a history" view of analytic philosophy. To me this is the minimum necessary for being considered an analytic philosopher.

It may seem implausible that the view of analytic philosophy just specified has no particular content. Surely, one might argue, there are at least some family resemblances among analytic philosophers, for example, some kinds of concerns with language (or science) and/or a belief that attention to language can be of value in resolving philosophical issues. It's true that such a family resemblance notion would be inclusive enough to encompass Austin and Ryle as well as Russell, Carnap, Quine, and numerous contemporary analytic philosophers; however, it is very broad. Given the attention to language paid by poststructuralists, we would need to distinguish various kinds (and purposes) of attention to language if we hope to "get it right." I would not start down that road, for even if we get it exactly right, it fails to capture what sets analytic philosophers apart from their most vociferous critics.

It is more helpful to remember that at any given time, analytic philosophy is always only one of several philosophical traditions in the academy. The specific features that analytic philosophers use to identify themselves need to play up the contrast between themselves and the current "other." Think of examples of the historical others just in Western traditions: idealists, Whiteheadians, pragmatists, Marxists, existentialists, phenomenologists, critical theorists, hermeneuticists, structuralists, poststructuralists. Thus today analytic philosophers do not define themselves in contrast to idealists, but to poststructuralists, Rortyean neopragmatists, and others. This kind of self-definition does not grow simply from an elitist need to exhibit superiority to those around one ("I don't read/understand Derrida = Derrida is not a philosopher"), although it is hard to deny the existence of this attitude. More charitably, I try to understand such a self-definition in the context of the desire for improved clarity and precision. Analytic philosophers tend to start with something or play off against something they can improve upon, a claim to which they can find counterexamples, an attack they can find circular, and so on. They do this both with one another's analytic work and by defending, for example, against "wrongheaded" postmodern relativists.[3]

Today perhaps the most salient contrast between analytic philosophers and the "others" is not concern with language, but a difference over the place of theory and the role and meaning of rationality, objectivity, and truth. Of course, it is difficult to speak in general about the wide range of analytic philosophers (here I feel the pull of the word "postanalytic"), for Quine, Davidson, Putnam, Sellars, and many others have argued persuasively to undermine central analytic "doctrines." Where we demarcate the analytic and the postanalytic is probably a matter of degree along several axes (with the precise locations of little importance). The most I'd be willing to say is that there is still a cluster of views held by many analytic philosophers, for example, the resistance to relativism (in whatever terms they define it), the appeal to mainstream concepts of objectivity, truth, and reason in arguing their positions, a defense of *some* form of modernism (perhaps picking and choosing one very carefully). These are ways of rejecting the neopragmatist and postmodern critiques from both sides of the North Atlantic.

I'm dubious whether there is any more extensive core or set of features specifying "analytic philosophers" today. In fact, I wouldn't even press the meager features above to pick out all and only analytic philosophers. Hilary Putnam commented that if his "former self of the 1950s had been put to sleep and awakened today, it would not recognize what is now called analytic philosophy" (Putnam, quoted in Borradori 1994, 58). My point is that *something* is called analytic philosophy today, and some feminists identify with it and find it useful for feminist theorizing, and others find it woefully androcentric.

FEMINIST CONTROVERSIES

In this section I point to a few examples of analytic feminist philosophers, illustrating their attraction to analytic philosophy and a few strategies for using analytic methods for feminist purposes. In the course of this discussion I also briefly review a few feminist criticisms of analytic philosophy. Readers not already familiar with this feminist literature will not get a sense of its richness from my brief sketch; however, I hope they will be encouraged to investigate it further.

Analytic philosophy appeals to some feminists either for its own sake or for the usefulness they see in it for feminist theorizing. For example, Sally Haslanger explains the appeal of analytic metaphysics and epistemology:

> Although I am alarmed by the thought of claiming this [analytic] tradition, and although I can clearly see that there are other options, I am determined not to give it up. First, because I find so much of it beautiful, inspiring, and important. I am moved by the questions, the methods, and some of the answers; and I want the tradition to survive. Second, because I believe it matters who carries on the tradition. I don't want a small group of privileged white men to continue to control it, for those who carry it on will be those who define where it goes next. I believe (perhaps overoptimistically) that the tradition can tolerate different voices, and that it can develop through internal conflict. (1992, 113)

Although in this passage Haslanger is not addressing the value of analytic philosophy for feminist projects, she has quite elegantly so used it, for example, in "On Being Objective and Being Objectified" (1993), a very rich, careful analytic work on gendered ideals of reason and objectivity focusing in part on Catharine MacKinnon's work.

Jane Duran finds the rigor and precision of analytic philosophy appealing: "The virtues of analytic precision, whether they be of androcentric origin or not, are sufficiently strong that the failure of feminist theory to use them would represent a major theoretical oversight" (1991, 246).

Feminists who explicitly defend analytic philosophy tend to do at least three things: (i) acknowledge that there have been misogynist uses or androcentric features of the analytic tradition, (ii) specify which (recent) strand of analytic philosophy can be useful to feminists, and (iii) argue that feminist critics' attacks on analytic philosophy do not apply to this strand.

Duran provides a clear example of (i) as she sympathetically treats the critiques made by Sandra Harding, Evelyn Fox Keller, and Susan Bordo as "constitutive of feminist moves in epistemology. . . . There is a masculinist, androcentric tradition that yields a hypernormative, idealized, and stylistically

aggressive mode of thought" (Duran 1991, 8).[4] For Duran this tradition includes analytic philosophy, its analogue, scientific empiricism, and the European traditions from which they stem. I will return later to Duran's strategy to ameliorate the negative androcentric features of this tradition.

Before discussing (ii), let us turn briefly to the feminist critics of analytic philosophy. As I reread the most frequently cited "feminist critics," I was struck by their infrequent explicit mention of analytic philosophy. Very few focus on analytic philosophy per se; it often comes under criticism by implication, by analogy, or because of its reliance on earlier androcentric theories. Some work has focused on historical figures, for example, Susan Bordo's work on Descartes (1987) and Genevieve Lloyd's work linking masculinity and reason in several major historical figures (1984). Others such as Sandra Harding (1986, 1991) and Evelyn Fox Keller (1985, 1992) have written extensively on science. Alison Jaggar's critical discussion of abstract individualism and normative dualism in *Feminist Politics and Human Nature* took place in the context of the limitations of liberal political theory and its empiricist underpinnings (1983). Of course, the fact that their primary focus was not analytic philosophy does not mean that their critiques are not pertinent to it, but it should at least be noted that none of them has taken the most recent versions of analytic philosophy as her principal target.[5]

Other feminists who do explicitly criticize analytic philosophy often draw on the work of most of the feminists mentioned in the preceding paragraph. For example, in *Is Women's Philosophy Possible?* (1990), Nancy Holland argues that contemporary analytic philosophy, "by remaining within the Empiricist tradition, inherits not only the problems of that tradition, but also a self-definition that identifies it as necessarily men's philosophy. . . . [Men's] philosophy defines itself throughout its history in such a way as to exclude what our culture defines as women's experience from what is considered to be properly philosophical" (3). Holland vigorously attacks analytic philosophy by arguing against its antecedent "empiricist individualism" in Locke and Hume (although she admits that feminists may have less to fear from analytic philosophy with "less metaphysical baggage," for example, Austin, Wittgenstein, and Quine [Holland 1990, 95]). She objects to the dualistic and hierarchical assumptions of modern European metaphysics and finds that analytic philosophy relies on them.

Her argument weaves together numerous previous feminist themes including Jaggar's critique of abstract individualism (the view that "essential human characteristics are properties of individuals and are given independently of any particular social context" [Jaggar 1983, 42]) and what she takes to be Harding's view that "Empiricism rules women out of philosophy . . . by ruling them out of science, which is the standard of rationality for Empiricism and for all of Anglo-American philosophy" (Holland 1990, 7).

I am not calling into question Holland's use of Jaggar or Harding. For Jaggar herself draws a connection between the good (disinterested, detached) scientist of positivism and the abstract individual of liberal political philosophy (Jaggar 1983, 356). And Harding would not disclaim the analogy between scientific empiricism and analytic philosophy. However, it is important to note that although Harding argues that feminist empiricism undermines key empiricist notions (and that feminist empiricism has limitations), she does not advocate that the work of feminist empiricism should be given up. Even in her 1991 book, she continues to encourage feminist empiricist projects as well as projects from her own preferred "feminist postmodernist standpoint" (Harding 1991, 47-49, 105-37). Each type of project speaks effectively to different audiences and reveals limitations in the prefeminist discourse from which it grew.

How have analytic feminists tried to meet or avoid these criticisms? To sketch an answer leads us to (ii), the recent strands of analytic philosophy that feminists find useful. Although there is a wide variety of analytic feminist work, I use feminist naturalized epistemology as an example, focusing on Jane Duran, Lynn Hankinson Nelson, and Louise Antony. I've selected their work because of its cluster of related issues and because each author explicitly addresses "feminist critics" of analytic philosophy.

First, a few words about naturalized epistemology. Hilary Kornblith characterizes naturalized epistemology as the view that the question "How ought we to arrive at our beliefs?" cannot be answered independently of the answer to "How do we arrive at our beliefs?" (1994, 3). Although there are many versions of naturalized epistemology as well as disputes about the appropriate roles of descriptive and normative elements, what is central to it is that empirical studies, for example, in cognitive science, in psychology, and concerning social factors, constitute an integral part of epistemology. Naturalized epistemologists care about the ways in which people make inferences in their real lives, actually acquire beliefs about probabilities, modify their beliefs to cohere better with others in their group, and so on.[6]

Now, briefly, the three feminist naturalized epistemologists. Duran's goal in *Toward a Feminist Epistemology* (1991) is a rigorous feminist epistemology. Her strategy is to utilize "naturalized analytic epistemology" (240) as found in the work of Alvin Goldman and Hilary Kornblith (and to a lesser extent others such as the neurophilosophy of Patricia Smith Churchland) to help supply the rigor for her work toward a "gynocentric" epistemology. She believes that naturalized epistemology can meet major feminist criticism of the analytic tradition (e.g., that it is hypernormative, idealized, and stylistically aggressive). For naturalized epistemology is descriptive, not hypernormative; it is not idealized, but concerned with the context and details of knowing, and it is capable of including features recommended by feminist standpoint epistemologists, for example, relational aspects of knowing and being grounded in the

body or in the activities of daily life (Duran 1991, 112, 246). I'll return to this point in the next section.

Nelson and Antony both utilize versions of Quine's naturalized epistemology for feminist purposes. Nelson, in *Who Knows: From Quine to a Feminist Empiricism* (1990) and in later articles (e.g., 1993), articulates a version of feminist empiricism that views the core of empiricism to be a theory of evidence ("for which there is no viable alternative" [1990, 9]) and that separates from empiricism the individual knower usually associated with it. Nelson holds that communities, not individuals, are the primary knowers, the primary epistemological agents. Thus her version of empiricism is not subject to the kinds of criticism raised by Jaggar against abstract individualism and "empiricist" accounts of knowing. Nelson also believes that her position combines the valid insights of feminist science critics such as Harding and Keller with an empiricism centered in a community of knowers.[7] Her aim is for her work to be a bridge among feminists, scientists, and philosophers of science.

In "Quine as Feminist: The Radical Import of Naturalized Epistemology," Antony takes on feminist critiques of analytic philosophy, especially epistemology (1993). She argues that although "there are specific questions or problems that arise as a result of feminist analysis, awareness, or experiences that any adequate epistemology must accommodate," there is no need for a "specifically feminist alternative to currently available epistemological frameworks" in order to accommodate them (187). Antony believes that feminist opponents of analytic philosophy (she includes Jaggar and Harding, along with Jane Flax [1987] and Lorraine Code [1989]) have oversimplified or misinterpreted various historical controversies in rationalism and empiricism, have overstated analytic philosophy's reliance on empiricism, and have attacked a version of "mainstream epistemology" that current analytic philosophers reject (Antony 1993, 191-203).[8]

The focus of Antony's positive argument for naturalized epistemology is that it resolves the "paradox of bias" (that is, the difficulty that arises when one wants to critique biases, e.g., male bias, at the same time one objects to the very notion of unbiased, neutral, objective, or impartial knowledge [Antony 1993, 189]). Naturalized epistemology eschews the ideal of neutrality and gives us empirical norms by which to differentiate good from bad biases, that is, those biases that lead to rather than away from truth.

Of course, naturalized epistemologists are not the only analytic feminist philosophers; I cite them merely as examples. For the past couple of decades many feminists have simply applied the various tools of analytic philosophy to a wide range of topics without making methodological comments. New examples can be found by leafing through philosophy journals. I recently found a paper by Rae Langton called "Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts" (1993). Langton uses Austin's distinctions among locutionary, illocutionary, and per-

locutionary acts to explicate Catharine MacKinnon's claims that pornography silences women and subordinates women. Langton's essay is a wonderful example of the use of an analytic device to illuminate a set of very thorny feminist issues.

My intent in this section has not been to resolve the controversies among feminists, but primarily to illustrate the kinds of strategies used by analytic feminists and secondarily to note that feminists such as Harding, Jaggar, and Bordo did not focus on attacking the latest versions of analytic philosophy. It is not disrespectful of the importance of their arguments to say that discussion should continue about which, if any, strands of analytic philosophy can be useful for feminists.

Is analytic philosophy minimally decent?

Let us return to the nine questions about method to discuss whether analytic philosophy can be a minimally decent method for a feminist. I remind the reader of what I have either assumed or argued for so far. Current analytic philosophy is of the "clear and rigorous tools with a history" variety and includes naturalized epistemology as one strand. Feminist analytic philosophy does exist, but feminist criticisms of analytic philosophy should not be ignored. In this section I try to be as charitable as possible toward analytic philosophy; it feels as if I am bending over backward.

1. Do the goals or objectives of analytic philosophy tend to reinforce the current values of a society, even if oppressive to women and other marginalized groups, or do they lend themselves to the possibility of social change?

I take the most agreed upon goal of analytic philosophy today to be clarity (perhaps with truth as a goal for some). How can clarity be oppressive? The answer can start in terms of what clarity can do, what it can't, and what the focus on it prevents us from doing. Most analytic philosophers, both today and in the past, see the goal of clarity as apolitical or at most as a contribution to combating irrational fanaticism (or its diluted relatives—prejudice, stereotyping, and so on). They would deem it "extraphilosophical" if a philosopher's political or moral values lead him or her to use clarity as a means to some other goal; that would not be the goal of analytic philosophy. Yet clarity can have a democratizing effect: if we emphasize the clarity of plain speech over elitist academic language or jargon-filled technicalities, we enable a somewhat wider range of people to participate in the discussion. Although no further social change is guaranteed by clarity, at least a focus on clarity can bring issues to light and let the chips fall where they may.

At the same time, clarity itself disturbs nothing, disrupts no oppressive status quo, thereby often reinforcing it. In addition, we must ask who decides what is clear and what motivates their decisions. Some analytic philosophers wield

clarity as a weapon to limit what counts as philosophical and to dismiss criticism without listening carefully to it. But even when well-intentioned and based on broad consensus, a focus on clarity does not encourage us to range broadly with our questions, to take leaps and risk failure, or to dig deeply to uncover what might be wrong or limiting about our already "clear" concepts, or about the assumptions and implications of our goals and method. If, as feminists, we aim at clarity, we will need to supplement this goal with others that are more likely to produce social change.

So is clarity a minimally decent goal? Not if taken alone, but perhaps useful in concert with others. Insofar as it is possible to separate tools from goals, my own preference would be to think of clarity as a tool, downplaying its role as a goal.[9]

What about those who aim for truth? For those who can set aside postmodern criticism, it would be hard to complain about *real* truth. The problems have been created by the certainty of those who have settled for impostors.

2. Does analytic philosophy's recommended or typical ways of formulating problems or issues, asking questions, and setting forth theories encourage the inclusion of a wide variety of women's points of view? For example, can women's various interests or experiences guide the choice of questions one asks about knowledge, language, or morality?

Despite controversies among feminists over the existence and meaning of "women's points of view" or "women's interests," I know of no feminist who has praised analytic philosophy as a whole for its inclusion of women's points of view or interests (whatever they might be). Many have found it wanting (e.g., Code 1991). But because some find that one advantage of naturalized epistemology lies in its ability to accommodate women's points of view, let us search for minimal decency in it. The first good sign for feminists is the interdisciplinary character of naturalized epistemology. For although interdisciplinary work is not necessarily liberatory, feminists have long recommended breaking through disciplinary boundaries in doing feminist theory. Next, Jane Duran believes that earlier normative, non-naturalized epistemology with its concern for what ideal "would-be knowers" ought to do is far removed from many women's epistemological concerns and has placed women at a disadvantage as knowers. Not only are women's questions overlooked, but women should not dare to ask questions. For Duran, naturalized epistemology, coupled with feminist motivations, furnishes hope. Naturalized epistemology, via cognitive science, will lead us into investigations about how women as well as men come to have knowledge; investigations will concern real contexts of knowing and various methods of justification, with none having privileged status (Duran 1991, 4-8). Duran also thinks it likely that Gilligan-inspired "female voice" characteristics, such as concern with context, listening to competing voices, and coherentist views of justification will be well attended

to by naturalized epistemology. Duran could be right, regardless of whether one agrees that these characteristics are "female."

Of course, even if it is minimally decent, naturalized epistemology is not the singular answer to feminists' prayers. The natural and social sciences that are supposed to ameliorate the normative quality of non-naturalized epistemology have also been criticized for gender and racial bias. In addition, to the extent that naturalized epistemology emphasizes cognitive science and psychology rather than social factors in epistemology, it focuses on individuals and neglects the impact of social structures on knowing. Feminist philosophers cannot cease to be vigilant simply because other disciplines have come into the philosophical picture.[10]

3. Are the strategies used by analytic philosophy for answering its questions, solving its problems, and supporting its theories compatible with the vast array of human styles of learning, of justification, and of decision making?

In asking this question I assume merely that individual differences exist in styles of learning, justification, and decision making, not that these differences are deeply rooted in groups defined by gender, ethnicity, class, and so on. Analytic philosophy has been attacked by both feminists and nonfeminists for its aggressive, combative, adversarial, even coercive language and style (such as knockdown arguments, tough-mindedness, the hunt mentality, the coercive force or punch of deductively valid arguments).[11] Such features do not suit everyone's style of thinking and behavior! Insistence on styles and strategies such as these, combined with at least a dash of elitism and condescension, tends to exclude many (perhaps most) women and men from philosophy. Such insistence is wrong—even if some of us rather like behaving this way from time to time.

Not all analytic philosophy has these stylistic characteristics, however. Duran and others see improvements in stylistic features of naturalized epistemology; perhaps as the amount of close description of knowers increases, the amount of aggression decreases!

In addition, we should not overlook ordinary language philosophy. Of course, it is a mixture of virtues and vices. J. L. Austin was more on target than he ever imagined when he said, "Our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions *men* have found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth marking, in the lifetimes of many generations" (Austin 1961, 130, my emphasis). Ordinary language philosophers might look very conservative, for they focus on the concepts of the status quo and on what the "best" speakers of the language say (not to mention talk of words that "wear the trousers"). However, the strategies and style of ordinary language philosophy fare much better than those of other forms of analytic philosophy. Ordinary language philosophy is much closer to daily life, common sense, and "the dainty and the dumpy" (to continue the Austinian terminology). It is practiced more collec-

tively, explores connections without requiring linear, deductive, or combative style, deals with emotions as well as rational concepts, and so on. And Wittgenstein's aphoristic talk of misleading pictures, bewitchment by language, uncovering nonsense, and curing philosophical diseases can certainly be suggestive to feminists.[12] Had academic feminism arisen in the heyday of ordinary language philosophy, I'd wager that many feminist philosophers would be intrigued by "what we are tempted to say" as "raw material" (Wittgenstein 1958, #254) for feminism.

Minimally decent? Yes and no, depending on which style of analytic philosophy you pick.

4. Are the central concepts and assumptions of analytic philosophy gender-biased, not merely in their origin, but in very deep, continuing ways?

This is perhaps one of the most controversial questions analytic feminists (and most other feminist philosophers) face. To what extent can concepts or assumptions shake off their origins? How does conceptual change take place? Take just one sample feminist debate over the concept of reason in the precursors of analytic philosophy, especially Descartes. First, there is disagreement over the identification of Cartesian reason with masculinity. For example, Margaret Atherton has argued (1993) that Genevieve Lloyd (1984) and Susan Bordo (1987) in different ways were wrong to identify reason with masculinity in Descartes. Atherton points to the use made of Descartes's notion of reason by two of his contemporaries, Mary Astell and Damaris Masham, who both relied on it to make a case that women are rational. Although I cannot plunge into this historical debate, let me note that unless Bordo and Lloyd argue that the only possible use of Cartesian reason is as a gatekeeper to deny rationality to women (which I don't read them as saying), nothing precludes other thinkers from using Descartes's work for their own purposes. This variability of interpretation is familiar to us: Aristotle, Hume, Quine, and Wittgenstein didn't set out to be useful to feminists either.[13]

Even if we assume that reason has historically been gendered masculine, the second question concerns its continuing force. Phyllis Rooney (1991) and Genevieve Lloyd (1993) have explored ways in which the metaphors that gender reason continue to influence our thinking deeply. But even if we had time to sort through the complex empirical and conceptual issues involved and all were to agree that reason continues to be gendered so deeply that we can't "just say no" to its influence, we would still have a problem. For we cannot simply walk away from the concept of reason and leave it at the disposal of nonfeminists. Regardless of the postmodern critics, we need a concept of reason, and we're entitled to try to transform it.[14] But how conceptual change takes place is a very complex matter. Atherton offers a characterization of reason that is an interesting starting point: take reason to be "what it is that all styles of reasoning have in common"; then to exclude women from it would

"fail to cohere with . . . women's experience of her mental capacities" and so would simply be wrong (Atherton 1993, 32).

Minimally decent? Too complicated to attempt an answer. And unfortunately, all methods, prefeminist or feminist, must grapple with complex issues about conceptual change. We realize that concepts can change, for example, in law as well as in daily life; however, it is not a simple matter to explain to what extent (or how) we might extract a concept from its history.[15]

5. Does analytic philosophy allow various kinds of people, especially women and others who have been subordinated or marginalized in academia, to be recognized authorities?

Let me first clarify that I am not speaking simply about increasing the numbers of people of color, women, and other subordinated groups as certified members of the academy. It is also a structural question about whose voices should count in philosophical conversations. Analytic philosophy in general does not do well here. Although in principle a philosopher's arguments and counterexamples can be made by anyone (a notion reinforced by the disembodied voice of analytic philosophy), it would be ludicrous to claim that a third world sex worker could think up the Gettier counterexamples and have them be equally telling. She has no voice, no community of access, no listeners or evaluators. She is not part of knowledge making at all.

Naturalized epistemology does not fare much better. The authorities are still the researchers, although subjects should range more broadly (and be more democratically selected). But despite the fact that being the subject of research does not make someone an "authority," it is nevertheless good that the subject's experience matters to the theoreticians.

How could philosophy (analytic or not) fare better? To start with, philosophers need to reconsider who is labeled a philosopher, both historically and in the present. Although W. E. B. Du Bois, Alain Locke, Simone de Beauvoir, Hannah Arendt, Simone Weil, Christine de Pisan, and Hypatia have often not been welcomed at the table as "philosophers," this attitude can change. Next, philosophers can look for ideas in places that don't "look like philosophy," for example, poetry, novels, or films. In addition, people without academic credentials have interesting ideas; Patricia Hill Collins cites students and domestic workers along with certified academicians to make her epistemological points (1990).

The obvious feminist standard of comparison (from which the question is drawn) is the method used in feminist standpoint epistemology. It starts investigations from women's lives (in Harding's 1991 version). Note that one simply starts with women's lives; one doesn't start and end with women's lives, experiences, or points of view. Nevertheless, diverse women do play a more authoritative role than in prefeminist philosophical methods.

Minimally decent? Not as usually practiced, but to be fair, many of us in the academy need improvement here. Feminists as well as nonfeminists are often guilty of reserving places at the conversation table for those comfortably similar to ourselves. After all, who is included most easily in the conversation of this essay?

6. Can analytic philosophy be of assistance in evaluating feminist-motivated research?

The answer here is both positive and negative, depending on the features of research we are evaluating. We wouldn't expect analytic philosophy to supply "vision" or to be good at the more creative, political, value-laden aspects of feminist research, for example, generating ideas, breaking rules, pushing boundaries, finding hidden androcentric assumptions of previous methods and subject matter. In fact, Harding sees the frustration of social scientists and biologists' trying to add women or gender to their research as a major factor in generating the need for new epistemologies (1991, 105). Such epistemologies require different methods.

What we can expect from analytic philosophy is mundane but very useful help in carrying out our chosen projects well, following whatever rules we adopt for our research. The tools of analytic philosophy—being careful, clear, and rigorous in our thinking—are valuable. But they go only so far.

Minimally decent? In some ways, yes, but in more ways, no.

7. Does analytic philosophy facilitate uncovering roles that gender, politics, power, and social context play in philosophy as well as in other facets of life?

This would not be a strong feature of analytic philosophy in general, for its focus tends to abstract from contexts, to discuss idealized situations. (This may even be what has led some analytic philosophers to read thinkers in other traditions, such as Foucault.) If naturalized epistemology is to fare better, it must include the work of a wide range of social sciences, especially sociology; cognitive science and psychology, insofar as they focus on the individual, won't be enough. Numerous sociologists work on relevant projects, and some of Kathryn Pyne Addelson's work in "descriptive epistemology" and ethics combines sociology and philosophy very helpfully.[16]

Minimally decent? Only if analytic philosophy includes a great deal of description, for example, from sociology.

8. Does analytic philosophy provide adequate grounds for intersubjective agreement concerning feminist-motivated knowledge claims and progress in feminist politics?

Intersubjective agreement is one of the strongest features of analytic philosophy when contrasted with other contemporary alternatives such as poststructuralism and neopragmatism. Feminists who are otherwise attracted to poststructuralist approaches often worry about losing a basis to support

feminist politics and losing the ability to claim that diverse women really are oppressed and that oppression is wrong (see Nicholson 1990). Analytic philosophy, with its Enlightenment roots, provides such a basis. In fact, analytic philosophers probably wouldn't even bother with the term "intersubjective agreement," because they are willing to use the more forceful language of truth and objectivity. This is of great value to feminists such as Louise Antony who want to be able to make claims such as the following: "The real problem with the ruling-class worldview is not that it is biased; it's that it is false. . . . The recipe for radical epistemological action then becomes simple: Tell the truth and get enough power so that people have to listen" (Antony 1993, 214). In addition, moral and political philosophy from the analytic tradition provide feminists with plenty of tools for reasoned intersubjective judgments distinguishing right from wrong, and for judging better or worse political goals and strategies.

Minimally decent? Yes. Of course, feminists raise questions about intersubjective agreement (not to mention truth and objectivity), for example, about who counts as a subject in intersubjective agreement, about the biases the whole community of subjects share, and so on (see Harding 1991; Longino 1990). However, analytic philosophy does provide a framework for intersubjective agreement that feminists have found useful.

9. Are criteria for success and failure in analytic philosophy appropriate for feminist goals?

Philosophical success is often measured in terms of the production of good (or, for some, useful or true) theories. Smaller successes in analytic philosophy might simply be the production of a great counterexample, a rigorous argument, or an illuminating conceptual analysis. On feminist grounds a good theory should, for example, illuminate women's lives, provide a conceptual framework for justifying political goals, or lead to an understanding of a variety of women's ways of integrating feeling and knowing. In discussing previous questions, I noted that the narrow focus of analytic philosophy can constrain feminist thinking; however, within its scope, analytic success can be feminist success as well. Remember Marilyn Frye's 1975 paper, "Male Chauvinism: A Conceptual Analysis"?

To consider possible conflicts between success for analytic philosophers and for feminists, let's look at "rigorous argument." I agree with Rorty that rigorous argument takes place within (Kuhnian) "normal" philosophy. Yet feminists, even analytic feminists, move at least some distance from "normal" philosophy; feminists see things in new ways. So can Jane Duran incorporate analytic philosophy's rigor into feminism? Since rigor can come in degrees, Duran can be more rigorous rather than less, and focus more on rigorous argument than on speculation or elucidation. The danger occurs if our focus on rigor leads us to exclude or depreciate exciting ideas that are still "ill-formed."

Minimally decent? A mixed answer we've seen before: can be useful within its scope, but can be constraining.

Despite the fact that much more needs to be said on all these questions, including whether they are the right questions to ask, where does analytic philosophy stand? In limited ways (and strands) it is minimally decent; in other ways and strands, it hinders feminists' work. I can certainly understand why some feminists want to walk away from it, but I can also understand why those who are predisposed to find it useful would keep trying to work with it. It makes one feel as if it's possible to get things right. As the analytic tradition tries to overcome the objections of its multifarious internal and external critics, it has become more "feminist friendly." (Of course, one might think, "with friends like this. . . .") Seriously, we simply cannot ignore that it has been useful in some ways: good work has come from analytic feminists. In this respect at least, analytic methods have value.

But is the part of analytic philosophy that is minimally decent substantial enough to warrant thinking of it as analytic philosophy? And have feminists undermined so much of analytic philosophy that it is not even recognizable? These questions should be answered by someone who has a deeper commitment to analytic philosophy than I have. For I agree with Harding that we can expect feminists to undermine their various "paternal" discourses. If clear thinking and a bit of rigorous argument are all feminists can use from analytic philosophy, I don't mind. If that makes me "postanalytic," I'll get used to a new label (as long as it isn't "postfeminist").[17]

I noted in the introduction that I wrote this essay hoping to set my mind at ease. I haven't. However, I have had to acknowledge the extent to which I am in the grip of analytic philosophy. The reader will never know how many times I had to suppress the urge to disembody my voice, to abstract from context, to make more distinctions, or to add another qualifier to hedge my bets. The most I have resolved personally is that at this time I will continue to use some tools of analytic philosophy when they seem helpful, to recognize their limitations and be led by feminist values, and to continue my scrutiny for evidence of pictures (analytic or not) that might be holding me captive (Wittgenstein 1958, #115).

Feminists as Analytic Philosophers

In feminist controversies over analytic philosophy there is an underlying issue to which I now return briefly: the value of feminists doing analytic philosophy itself. The issue arises in part because feminists who work in traditional analytic philosophy have sometimes felt politically attacked for their choice of intellectual pursuits.[18]

First, there is the matter of liberal tolerance. Barring oppression of others, harm to self, or other forms of immorality, each feminist can choose to focus

her work life as she sees fit. I am glad that Martina Navratilova plays tennis, that Lucile Jones of Cal Tech explains earthquakes to anxious Southern Californians, and that Nancy Cartwright does philosophy. To argue that feminists should not do analytic philosophy would require, first, that we support its being placed in one of the "immoral" categories above, and, second, that we believe that feminists cannot make a difference to its "immorality." I could not make such an argument.

Yet this is not to say that feminists who do analytic philosophy (or any other kind of philosophy) should never be asked to explain their interest in something that another feminist believes is egregiously sexist. This should be part of an ongoing feminist dialogue. The questions, "Why Quine? Why Aristotle?" often arise out of genuine puzzlement, not as a self-righteous demand for justification. For each feminist struggles, sometimes with great difficulty, to reconcile her own interests and values. It may be very helpful to talk with others whose reconciliations differ. Sometimes we may have thrown out the baby when it was merely the dirty diaper that needed disposal, but sometimes not.

There is also the broader issue of the extent to which feminists choose to work within institutions (or traditions) or to break with them. The world is filled with institutions run by men of dominant groups; these institutions (and these men) function primarily in their own interests. Each feminist chooses, over and over again, which institutions to walk away from, which to try to reform, and (at least for some of us weak-willed feminists) which to live with hypocritically. I might walk away from Christianity, try to reform the university, and cite weakness of will as I explain my being married. Other feminists will make very different choices about these institutions and support their choices well.

With respect to analytic philosophy, think of exemplars of the range of supportable choices: Joyce Trebilcot walked away (1994), but Sally Haslanger, finding beauty in it, favors reform (1992). (Weakness of will may be more difficult: resolving to eschew the overuse of x and y, but failing to do so?) I would no more try to talk Haslanger out of analytic philosophy than I would try to talk Trebilcot into it. For even if I lose interest in the topics that Haslanger finds so appealing, I am extremely glad that she is there to help define where the analytic tradition goes next and how it is done. The master never owned the house legitimately anyway!

NOTES

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University, Los Angeles and in the Pacific Division of the Society for Women in Philosophy who, on a moment's notice, were willing to provide helpful oral and written comments and discussion. Finally, my apologies to Judith Jarvis Thomson for shamelessly stealing "minimally decent."

1. The work of Barbara Herman and Marilyn Frye gave me the idea for the questions. Frye set out features of "virgin women" in the context of asking whether it is possible to be a feminist without being a lesbian (1992). Herman, at a 1993 Pacific Division, American Philosophical Association session on Rita Manning's book, *Speaking from the Heart* (1992), discussed feminist conditions for the adequacy of any moral theory.

A few words about terminology and assumptions (all at once).

(a) Although my focus is on the method of analytic philosophy, the discussion inevitably extends into broader features of the analytic tradition, with no clear boundary between them.

(b) Some feminists use "epistemology" and "method" in ways that overlap. I assume that an epistemology needs a method.

(c) Some philosophers speak of "gynocentric" or "women's" philosophy rather than feminist philosophy. Although there could be gynocentric or women's philosophies that are nonfeminist, the authors I cite who use this terminology, Duran and Holland, are clearly motivated by feminism.

(d) I do not enter into a debate here over who merits the title "feminist." I cast as wide a net as possible, wanting to include anyone motivated by a reasonable formulation of feminist goals. However, not everyone whom I try to include would agree with the assumptions I make in asking these questions (nor, of course, with the correctness of the questions themselves). For example, I take an anti-elitist stance that one should try not to exclude anyone who is interested from doing feminist philosophy. I also keep an open mind concerning whether women and men differ deeply in styles of learning and expression, points of view, etc. But even more important to me than these assumptions is that disagreement about such issues does not define who is or is not a feminist.

2. Of course, the lines of historical influence sometimes overlap, and, especially in the case of pragmatism and analytic philosophy, there has been cross-fertilization. Philosophers such as Peirce and Quine are seen as pragmatists and as analytic, depending on which features of their views one emphasizes.

3. Two separate points here. First, by focusing on this level of contrast between analytic philosophy and the "others," I do not mean to deny the importance of power and the social context in which the contrast is embedded. Analytic philosophers have a sizable amount of institutional power—both in academic institutions and professional organizations—which they exercise in defining what (or who) is philosophical and what is not.

Second, one SWIP colleague took my "analytic/other" contrast a step further, maintaining that today the definition of analytic philosophy is wholly normative: analytic philosophers are those believed good by other analytic philosophers. To illustrate her point she told a story of an analytic philosopher on her dissertation committee who, after reading and liking Foucault, redefined analytic philosophy so that Foucault would be within it.

4. It is important to note that Duran does not agree completely with Harding's criticism of feminist empiricism. As we will see below, this difference between them enables Duran to argue for the usefulness of naturalized epistemology (1991, 244).

5. I don't mean to suggest that "Anglo-American" philosophy is never mentioned by these philosophers; it is, e.g., by Harding (1991), but it is not the focus of the works

of the 1980s that analytic feminists criticize. Other philosophers who are not as often cited/criticized, do explicitly criticize analytic philosophy, e.g., Code (1991), Addelson (1991), Sherwin (1989), Scheman (1993), Holland (1990). Of course, part of this is a matter of timing, but some of the essays in the latter list of books were available much earlier.

6. See Kornblith (1994) for several formulations of naturalized epistemology and examples of disputed topics and boundaries. Although much of the work in naturalized epistemology has centered on the individual agent, some philosophers include more broad-based social issues in the "naturalistic turn" in epistemology. For example, the work done by those in the social studies of science and sociology of knowledge can be seen as part of the naturalistic turn. I favor not worrying about the exact boundaries here; these fields are lively and changing quickly.

In this essay I treat naturalized epistemology as a strand of analytic philosophy rather than a successor subject to epistemology proper or "postanalytic." For although it breaks with key dogmas of earlier analytic philosophy, it is an attempt to answer some of the questions posed by normative analytic epistemology (for example, the elaborations of the response of a causal theory of knowledge to the Gettier counterexamples). In addition, it retains enough of the style of analysis of traditional epistemology that it fits the characterizations I made of analytic philosophy in Section II. Finally, the feminist naturalized epistemologists discussed here treat it as analytic philosophy.

7. For example, Nelson (1993) explains some of the ways in which her epistemological communities (and her communal account of evidence) can overcome the false "universality" claimed by mainstream philosophy/science and criticized by feminists. She believes that the partiality of knowledge requires that individualism be abandoned. Examples from Nelson (1990) include the ways in which her version of Quinean empiricism could (a) avoid the necessity for a neutral observer standpoint (which feminists, among others, have argued is impossible), (b) incorporate the social character of science and epistemology, and so on.

Helen Longino (1990) also offers a feminist empiricist account of science that should be of interest here.

8. Although Antony's discussion is long and complex, among her complaints against feminist critics of analytic philosophy are the following: they have distorted the "tradition" by making invisible the controversies about knowledge and the self in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (e.g., the controversy about the extent to which the structure of the mind can constrain the development of knowledge); they criticize a version of analytic philosophy that too closely resembles logical positivism and does not take into account the internal critics of analytic philosophy since the 1950s (e.g., Quine, Hempel, Goodman, and Putnam).

9. In recent conversations about clarity I have been struck by my colleagues and friends' wide range of interpretations of analytic clarity, not to mention their divergent opinions about it. Yet the only analytically trained feminist philosopher I found (even analytic "semi-manqué" as she labels herself) who explicitly makes disparaging remarks in print about clarity is Naomi Scheman (1993). In the context of discussing "the unity of privileged subjectivity" she comments favorably on the illuminating clarity of Black English and disfavorably on analytic philosophy's demand that language be a transparent medium through which we see (1993, 101). Although my views on method in general are very close to Scheman's, and I do appreciate her point that the "transparent representation" view of clarity came from early ideal language philosophers, I differ with her sense of its implications. Analytic clarity's "transparency" can be much broader than

seeing through to (the one) underlying reality. We can "see through" clear language simply to get the other person's point, idea, or feeling. Transparency allows us not to fight with the words in order to understand what someone is saying.

In a different context Scheman sees "clarity as a matter of transparency" as problematic insofar as it is connected to the analytic tendencies (a) to abstract arguments from their actual language (text), (b) to fail to recognize the value of metaphor, and (c) to fail to attend to "the exclusionary and marginalizing nature of language that implicitly positions the generic subject as male, able-bodied, heterosexual, white, and middle class" (1993, 249). These are very important points. (I hasten to add that in these same paragraphs she expresses a preference for even bad analytic writing over bad postmodern writing.)

10. Of course, it is also possible to object to naturalized epistemology for any of a number of nonfeminist reasons, for example, it might just beg (or simply avoid) too many difficult questions. My treatment of it here ignores these objections, for the scope of my concern is whether naturalized epistemology is more useful to feminists than is previous analytic philosophy. A feminist who has nonfeminist objections to naturalized epistemology would simply find the theory wrong and not use it.

11. See, for example, Moulton (1989), Nozick (1981). At a panel discussion called "Is Philosophy Cooperative?" at the 1994 Pacific Division, American Philosophical Association meeting, the room was populated with philosophers expressing preferences for more cooperative formats for discussion, for less jousting and nastiness, and so on. Not only was the session organized and chaired by a (white male) analytic philosopher (with three out of four analytic panel members), the demographics of the sympathetic audience were similar to most APA sessions—mostly white men with a small scattering of people of color and white women. (At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that some philosophers who are feminists like the traditional aggressive style and want to make sure that women and people of color are given equal opportunity to develop and use it well.)

12. See Wittgenstein (1958). It should be no surprise that the later Wittgenstein is claimed both by ordinary language philosophers and by some postmodernists. The fact that he is still my favorite misogynist might help explain my own mixed feelings about analytic philosophy.

13. Those interested in this kind of issue might consult two series of books: Nancy Tuana's series *Rereading the Canon* for Pennsylvania State University Press contains a number of edited volumes of feminist perspectives on major contemporary and historical philosophers; Bat-Ami Bar On has edited two volumes of feminist writings on classical and modern philosophers (1993a, 1993b).

14. I take postmodern criticisms of reason (and of other notions) more seriously than would be apparent from the short shrift I give them here. See Nicholson (1990) for postmodern discussions and Rooney (1994) for a general survey of feminist work on reason. An interesting feminist perspective on analytic philosophy and postmodern criticism is found in Scheman (1993, 245-49).

15. By focusing on the concept of reason, I have neglected the second aspect of the question—assumptions. But feminists must look at assumptions (and pictures), too, for philosophers make assumptions and employ pictures into which their concepts fit. For example, some analytic philosophers maintain that the important features of the world can be captured in symbolic logic, in other words, they "fit." If others note that the world embodies contradictions, so much the worse for the world. It doesn't damage the philosophical power of symbolic logic. Philosophers from many continents (and many persuasions including feminist) have found fault with such a picture/assumption.

16. See Addelson (1991, 1993). It is important to note that Addelson, unlike Duran or Antony, makes no case that she is doing analytic naturalized epistemology. About analytic philosophy Addelson says, "No one would argue that muddy thinking is preferable to clear thinking. But these [analytic] definitions of philosophical work preserve the separation of concept and fact as well as the image of human society as an aggregate of individuals doing mental gymnastics on the way to separate value choices and decisions" (1991, 113).

17. One form of "postanalytic" feminism that might be possible is "mitigated analytic feminism." I draw the word "mitigated" from Code's "mitigated relativism" (1991), but she might not approve of my using it in this context. A mitigated analytic feminist approach would take as a rule to deviate from traditional analytic methods whenever feminist goals require or even suggest it.

I have ignored many other factors that might go into the choice of a philosophical label to claim as one's own; although important, they are just the kinds of factors that analytic training does not equip us well to discuss—rhetorical strategies, identity politics, and so on. In addition, there is the issue of whether the use of philosophical labels promotes insularity and division and should be discouraged by feminists. My views are mixed here. Sometimes it can help feminist philosophers understand why we disagree with one another if we place the disagreement in the context of familiar academic labels such as "analytic" or "poststructuralist." However, if the use of these labels discourages some feminists from reading others (or even thinking they can not understand them), we should downplay their use.

18. For example, see two different symposia in the *APA Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy* on "Doing Philosophy as a Feminist" (Tuana 1992; Meyers 1993) as well as Antony (1993) and the introduction to Antony and Witt (1993).

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