[This is a draft version, not for citation. For citation, please use: "Husserl's Spatialization of Perceptual Consciousness," *Experiential Reason: Perception, Affectivity, and Volition in Husserl's Phenomenology*. *Phaenomenologica*, eds. R. Rubio, R. Walton, S. Taguchi (Springer, 2017)]

Husserl's Spatialization of Perceptual Consciousness

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Abstract. In this paper I show that, on Husserl's phenomenology of perception, the consciousness of any perceiving subject can take up space. What Husserl calls "noema" just is some intentional object. Thus any noema of perception just is the object of some perceptual experience. According to Husserl, since the noema of perception is immanent to the consciousness of the perceiving subject, the object of perception must also be in some sense immanent. In order to avoid confrontation by Husserl's anti-Brentanian claim that no intentional object can be immanent to any intentional act, I show that there are two different senses of immanence in Husserl: the "genuine"-sense and what Steven Crowell (2008) calls the "phenomenological"-sense. On this disambiguation, any perceptual object can be genuinely *transcendent* while remaining *phenomenologically* immanent. What is required for the second sense of immanence is a holistic conception of consciousness. However, Husserl is also a realist about the objects of perception: the object of perception is the actual object itself rather than some mental representation of anything like the Kantian thing in-itself. The objects of perception are spatial. Therefore, if any perceptual object is immanent to some consciousness then that consciousness must

also be spatial; hence, my spatialist interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology of perception.

1. *A phenomenological description of perception*

Let me start with two claims that, taken individually, should be intuitively appealing and even commonsensical. First is a partial description of the consciousness of some perceiving subject. For simplicity, let's just talk about visual perception. You are at the moment seeing under optimal visual conditions, and your visual abilities are "normal." At the moment, let's say you see the table in front of you, along with other furniture, walls, windows, scraps of paper and other people in the room. Now, inspect your consciousness. (You can call this process "reflection" or "introspection" or whatever you like. The terminology is not important right now.) What do you find? More specifically, what are the constituents of your consciousness—what make up your consciousness? I'm not asking for an exhaustive inventory. In fact, I want you to ignore anything that may be at all difficult to discern, like qualia or a disposition or the like. Instead, I'm hoping for some obvious examples. I believe an intuitively appealing reply can include items like the table in front of you, the chairs, the walls, the windows, the scraps of paper and, of course, the other people in the room. The room itself, along with the furniture and the occupants in it, can be regarded as, in some underdetermined sense, a part of your consciousness. Call this the claim of *phenomenological immanence*:[1]

[1] As I make clear in Sect. 2, I take this phrase from Crowell (2008), although he uses it in a sense different than mine.

1.1. The objects of perception can be regarded as making up or constituting, some part of consciousness.

For the moment, it's helpful to keep this sense of phenomenological immanence underdetermined. This appeal to intuition tells us nothing about the nature of these objects that appear to us as they do, or how it is that that we become aware of them. All that (1.1) *by itself* requires is some very thin sense about the most obvious contents of consciousness in perception, which can be ceteris paribus consistent with "ideas," "impressions," "Vorstellungen," "sense data," "representational content," or whatever traditional philosophical concepts about experience.

Second, I think the following claim also enjoys a great deal of intuitive appeal. If asked whether the furniture and the occupants in the room that you see are what everyone else in the room can also see, the obvious reply should be affirmative. What you see is just obviously what everyone else in the room can see. If both of us are looking at this table in front of us, what I see just is what you see. Of course, the table may appear somewhat differently to you than it does to me. But it is the same table. Call this the claim of *intersubjective identity*:

1.2. The objects of perception are identical between subjects. They are, typically, accessible to anyone perceptually comparable.[2]

A ready explanation of (1.2) is

[2] I add "typically" because in early onset glaucoma some patients see a black spot in their visual field. The black spot is an object of perception. It is not publicly accessible.

1.3. The objects of perception are physical. As physical objects, they take up a common spacetime shared by all actual objects, including the perceivers. It is this common, intersubjective spacetime that explains the public accessibility of perceptual objects.

However, there is a fourth claim, at least as intuitively appealing as any of the above, namely the mentalism about consciousness:

1.4. Consciousness is intrinsically mental or psychological. It's the introspectively accessible and private content of the subject's mind. Consciousness is obviously "in the head" in some metaphysically determinative sense.

This is the natural view about consciousness. In fact, it appears so obviously true that either "consciousness" doesn't mean anything, or one can simply add to (1.4) "After all, what else can it be?" in lieu of an argument.

The conjunction of (1.1) and (1.4) gets us a more determined sense of "objects of perception." Under the conjunction with (1.4), the sense of "objects" in (1.1) now entails that such objects are private or only introspectively accessible. This (1.4)-sense of "objects" is at odds with that sense of "objects" found in (1.2). Since the sense of "objects" in (1.1) now entails that they are also mental or psychological, it may also be opposed to the sense of "objects" in (1.3). In fact, the conjunction of (1.1) with (1.4) implies what Husserl calls the "general thesis:" i.e., the sense of "objects" in (1.1) is different than that in either (1.2) or (1.3).

Much of the history of philosophy—and most contemporary philosophers—operate under some version of (1.4), so they usually wind up subscribing to the general thesis. For instance, I think the Husserl of the first edition of *Logical Investigations* worked with (1.4) like this. Intentional states like beliefs and judgments may be directed at external objects but they expire at the borders of the mind, the self or the skull. There is no sense of consciousness other than the psychological sense of such intentional states. And working with the general thesis gets us to philosophical problems familiar to us since Descartes.[3]

In any case, note well: it is (1.4) that stands in the way of the conjunction of (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3) under a common sense of "object of perception." Unlike the Husserl of *Logical Investigations*, I believe that the Husserl from around 1907 onwards gave up (1.4) by what he calls "epoché" or the method of "phenomenological reduction," which allows the "objects" of (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3), to share a common sense. In Sect.'s 2 and 3, I show in what way Husserl is committed to (1.1). Then in Sect. 4, I show that spatialism about consciousness follows.

2. *The immanence of the noema*

I agree with the standard, majority interpretation that the noema is, in some sense, the intentional object.[4] This agreement is worth stating for my purposes because of a

[3] For example, Cartesian skepticism, mind-body problem, etc.

[4] The most comprehensive defense of the standard object-interpretation of the noema remains Drummond (1990). To a large extent, the view that I develop about the noema is derived from Drummond's. That is why I offer no positive arguments of my own that the noema is some kind of intentional object. Where I diverge from Drummond's view should be clear by the end of Sect. 3. For other object-interpretations, see: Gurwitsch

specific exegetical reason behind an influential alternative interpretation, which is most comprehensively presented by Smith and McIntyre (1982).[5] That exegetical reason is this. Husserl also claims that the noema is, in some sense, "immanent."

According to Smith and McIntyre's "mediator" interpretation of Husserl, the noema is not any kind of intentional object. Instead, the noema is some feature or aspect of the intentional act itself, which behaves roughly like Fregean sense (Smith and McIntyre 1982, pp. 88; see also, pp. 92-93).[6] For instance, on this view, my belief that the mayor is the tallest man in town is not about the proposition "that the mayor is the tallest man in town;" instead, the belief is about the mayor himself. However, the proposition does serve as the "content" of the belief, "which gives the act its directedness, and so makes it 'of' or 'about' " the mayor (Ibid, p. 93). On this view, then, the noema is Fregean sense if and only if Fregean sense is conceived of as some abstract property or aspect of the intentional state (i.e., propositional attitude) that is distinct from the latter's object (Ibid., pp. 106, 125). Like Searle (1982), Smith and McIntyre also believe that this Fregean representationalism about propositional attitudes, like beliefs and desires, can be extended to an analysis of perceptual episodes, like seeing and hearing.[7] Accordingly, in

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(1964), Welton (1983), Sokolowski (1987), Bell (1990), Banchetti (1993), Ströker (1993), Brainard (2002), Zahavi (2003), Shim (2005).

[5] Føllesdal (1969) is the origin of this view. Although a minority view within Husserl scholarship, this alternative interpretation of Husserl may be more influential on philosophers at large. For example, see Dreyfus (1982), Dummett (1993).

[6] For a more recent discussion of this "noetic, or act-based" Husserlian view of token meanings that I do endorse, see: Hopp (2011, esp. pp. 27-36). My agreement with Hopp—as opposed to Smith and McIntyre—rests on the fact that Hopp nowhere calls the conceptual "content" or aspect of an intentional act the "noema"; since, in general, Hopp takes no side at all in the noema debate (Hopp 2011, pp. 176-177). For a contemporary view that conceives representational "contents" to be features or aspects of intentional or psychological states rather than being their truth-value, see: Pitt (2009).

[7] Consequently, Smith and McIntyre are early advocates of conceptualism about perception.

seeing that the mayor is the tallest man in town, the proposition "that the mayor is the tallest man in town" somehow inheres in the psychological experience of seeing.

Perhaps the best exegetical reason for Smith and McIntyre's interpretation is that the noema is in some sense "immanent."[8] First, they claim that, "the phenomenological content of an act includes only what is 'immanent' in the act, what lies 'in' consciousness, making the experience the act that it is" (Smith an McIntyre 1982, p. 160). Second, they also claim that the noema "is called a 'content' because it is found among an act's 'immanent' experiential features and is brought to light only in reflection on the act" (Ibid, p. 121; also, p. 123). Later, they bring together these two claims: "Noemata are ideal contents of intentional experiences, grasped in phenomenological reflection, and so are *immanent*… By contrast, the essences or properties of physical objects are transcendent, just as physical things themselves are transcendent" (Ibid, p. 169; my italic). Here's why this may seem like a good exegetical reason for the mediator interpretation.

Husserl consistently insists on the view that the intentional object cannot be immanent to any particular experience. In particular, a veridical experience cannot consist in any object or its properties. This is Husserl's critique of Brentano's doctrine of "mental inexistence" or "immanent objectivity."[9] According to Brentano, every "mental phenomenon *includes* something as object *within itself*" (Brentano 1995, p. 88; my

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[8] Another exegetical reason in Smith and McIntyre is the following confusion between "*reell*" and "*real*." As Husserl uses these terms, "reell" means "genuine" or "authentic;" by contrast, by "real" he means spatio-temporal, so actual in a metaphysical sense. However, it appears Smith and McIntyre confuse these two distinct concepts and argue like this: since the noema is not a "reell"—i.e., not a genuine or authentic—component of the intentional act, it must be non-"real"—i.e., must be neither spatial nor temporal—and, therefore, the noema must be "ideal" or abstract (1982, pp. 119-125). This is an obvious terminological error and, thus, fails to motivate their interpretation.

[9] It should be noted that the later Brentano (1966) renounced this doctrine of "mental inexistence." For details, see: Smith and McIntyre (1982, pp. 47-54, 57-61).

italics). In contrast, Husserl is steadfast that, "an object is meant or aimed at" in an intentional experience; however, "*the* [so-called] 'immanent,' 'mental' *object* does not belong to the descriptive [*genuine*] component of the experiencing, it is thus in truth *not at all immanent or mental*" (Hua XIX, pp. 386-387; my italics). Husserl's objection is of a piece with his general skepticism about sense-data theories. If the intentional object of an experience is an inherent mental constituent then every new experience will entail a new intentional object. By the same token, no matter how many such immanent objects I perceive I will never get to perceive the physical object itself. As Husserl puts it, "we will wind up in the difficulty that now two realities should confront each other while only one is available and possible" (Hua III, p. 186). Instead, the intentional object must be "transcendent" to any particular intentional experience (Hua III, pp. 68-69, 73-78, 85-87).[10] Since neither any mental object nor any physical one can be genuinely immanent to any experience, you do not *perceive* any part of your perceptual experience. For instance, you do not *see* any part of your visual experience. Instead, you see *through* the experience.[11]

And yet, Husserl plainly asserts in *Ideas* I that the noema is, in some sense, "immanent." Husserl writes:

[10]As I will expand upon in Sect. 3, a sufficient condition for the transcendence of an intentional object is its numerical identity despite the diversity of intentional experiences about it (Hua III, pp. 69, 74-75; Hua XI, pp. 330-331).

[11] Throughout this paper, experience is a translation of "Erlebnis"—which is more accurately, though more awkwardly, translated as living through or undergoing. Among many reasons why Husserl is not a representationalist is that not all Erlebnisse are intentional or representational. Moods, emotions, proprioceptive states like pain and hunger, are for Husserl Erlebnisse—but they do not represent.

> Perception, for example, has its noema, at bottom its perceptual sense; that is, the perceived as such… In general, the noematic correlate—which is (in a very broadened meaning) here called "sense"—is precisely to be regarded as it lies "*immanently*" in the undergoing of perception [*Erlebnis der Wahrnehmung*]. (Hua III, p. 182; my italic)

Later, Husserl introduces the example of looking at a tree in the garden, "which now quietly stands, then appears to be moved by the wind, and which otherwise offers itself in variously different ways" (Hua III, p. 182). It is unmistakable that he's talking about a mundane spatiotemporal object, i.e., the tree and its properties. Then he asks what about this experience should

> remain as the phenomenological residuum, when we reduce [the experience] to '*pure immanence*,' and consider what should count as the genuine constituent of the pure lived experience, and what should not [be so considered]. And the matter makes itself entirely clear that… to the essence of living through the perception [Wahrnehmungserlebnisses] belongs the "perceived tree as such"—i.e., *the full noema—which is untouched by the exclusion of the actuality of the tree itself and the entire world*… (Hua III, p. 202; my italics)

Accordingly, since the noema remains "untouched by the exclusion" of the phenomenological reduction, the noema remains a part of the "phenomenological residuum" qua the purview of phenomenological inquiry (see also: Hua III, pp. 204-205).

In *Ideas* I, Husserl establishes the domain of phenomenology as "pure consciousness" or, what is coextensive with it, the "phenomenological residuum." Husserl writes that the phenomenologist "holds [her] focus steadily on the sphere of consciousness" and studies "what is found immanent in it" (Hua III, p. 59; see also, p. 202). What obviously belong within the purview of phenomenology are, of course, the genuinely immanent (or "noetic") features of psychological experiences, which Husserl deals with at length in the first edition of *Logical Investigations*.[12] However, in the second edition of *Logical Investigations*, Husserl remarks in a footnote that, as opposed to dwelling exclusively on the genuinely immanent features of experiences as he had in the first edition, his view from the period of *Ideas* I has advanced to include "intentional objectivity" as "what must also be phenomenologically considered" (Hua XIX, p. 411). If only what is immanent to consciousness belongs to the purview of phenomenology, and intentional objects are now to "be phenomenologically considered," then intentional objects must be immanent to consciousness. Indeed, Husserl is explicit that to the phenomenological residuum "belong the noemata with the noematic unity that lies in them" (Hua III, p. 204; also, pp. 220-221). By shifting our focus to consciousness itself, Husserl writes: "*We have, in fact, lost nothing*; instead, we have gained an entirely absolute being that, if correctly understood, holds *in itself*—'constitutes' *in itself—all worldly transcendences*" (Ibid, p. 94; my italics). For example, the "color of the tree trunk" in the phenomenological purview "is exactly 'the same' as that which, prior to the

[12] In *Ideas* I, Husserl admits quite frankly "the one-sidedness of the noetic orientation" in the *Logical Investigations* (Hua III, pp. 267-268; also, p. 195). That is, in the first edition of the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl dealt almost exclusively with features and properties of individual intentional acts—i.e., what is only *genuinely* immanent—as opposed to the objects at which such acts are directed. Smith and McIntyre's interpretation, therefore, turns out to be only germane to the noetic analysis of the first edition of *Logical Investigations*.

phenomenological reduction, we took to be [the color] of the actual tree" (Ibid., p. 202). As early as *The Idea of Phenomenology* from 1907, Husserl writes: "In the seeing of pure phenomena, the object is *not… outside of 'consciousness'* " (Hua II, p. 43; my italics). And in a manuscript from the early 1920s, Husserl even claims that a subject's entire "surrounding world [*Umwelt*] is *immanent*, insofar as immanent objects are constituted by virtue of intentionality" (Hua XIV, p. 47; my italics).

At face value, then, since Husserl claims both that the noema is in some sense "immanent" and that no intentional object can be immanent to any particular intentional experience, on the pain of inconsistency it would appear that the noema is not any kind of intentional object. And this is perhaps the best exegetical reason behind Smith and McIntyre's mediator-interpretation.

Recently, however, Steven Crowell (2008) has shown how this apparent exegetical conflict can be resolved to preserve the standard object-interpretation of the noema. Crowell simply points out that, in *The Idea of Phenomenology* from 1907, Husserl explicitly states that he is working with two different senses of the immanence-transcendence distinction. Recognizing these two different senses of the distinction should defuse the immanence of the noema as motivation for Smith and McIntyre's mediator-interpretation.

In the first sense, Husserl's immanence-transcendence distinction is the anti-Brentanian conception that I rehearsed above. As Crowell puts it, in this sense "the mental constitutes a sphere of 'genuine (*reell*) immanence' consisting of 'acts' such as believing, perceiving, desiring, and so on;" and corresponding "to this sense of 'genuine immanence' is 'genuine transcendence,' namely, that which is not a genuine part of the

mental process, not part of the psychological sphere" (Crowell 2008, p. 345; see Hua II, pp. 6-7, 34-35). In this "genuine" sense, as opposed to the various features and properties of the intentional experience itself that are "immanent" to that act, the intentional object would be—contra Brentano, as we saw—"transcendent" to it. If we read Husserl's claim about the immanence of the noema in this sense of "genuine immanence," the standard interpretation of the noema as some kind of intentional object would, indeed, be jeopardized.

However, Crowell then points out that, "while preserving the concept of genuine immanence and transcendence, [Husserl] introduces another conceptual pair—*intentional* immanence and transcendence—which henceforth serves as the basis for his transcendental concept of intentional content" (Ibid.; see also Hua II, 34-39, 49-50, 55). Following Crowell, I'll characterize this second sense as phenomenological immanence and transcendence. Faithful to the text, Crowell explains this second, phenomenological sense of the distinction as follows: "An object that is transcendent in the 'genuine' sense is not reinterpreted as something genuinely immanent; yet it can now be seen as *immanent in the phenomenological sense*, since it can be self-given or evident—not merely emptily 'posited' but there 'in person' " (Crowell 2008, p. 346; my italics).

The following example should elucidate what Crowell has in mind by the phenomenological sense of the distinction. Let me believe that the chair next door is red. If the chair next door (or the state of affairs specified by the proposition) is a numerically identical object about which I can have any number of different beliefs and attitudes, then the chair will be genuinely transcendent to my belief: i.e., the chair "is not a 'real part' of the mind" (Crowell 2008, p. 346). However, insofar as I have no intuition of the chair,

the chair will also be phenomenologically transcendent. In other words, the chair is not given to me intuitively as evidence for my belief; by my belief alone, the chair has only been "emptily posited." But should I get to eventually see the chair, the chair will now be *phenomenologically* immanent. Nevertheless, despite its phenomenological immanence through my perception of it, as a numerically identical object the chair will remain, as before, *genuinely* transcendent. On this reading, it is then entirely possible for an intentional object that is *genuinely* transcendent to some particular intentional experience to remain, nevertheless, *phenomenologically* immanent. So long as this phenomenological sense of the distinction is coherent, there should no longer be any obstacle to the claim that the noema can be both *phenomenologically* immanent and yet remain a *genuinely* transcendent intentional object.[13]

In this light, let's return to a passage from above that appeared to favor the mediator-interpretation. Again, after asking what about the experience of seeing a tree should "remain as the phenomenological residuum, when we reduce [the experience] to '*pure immanence*,' and consider *what should count as the genuine constituent of the pure lived experience, and what should not*," (my italics) Husserl writes that "to the essence of living through the perception belongs the 'perceived tree as such'—i.e., the full noema—which is untouched by the exclusion of the actuality of the tree itself and the entire world" (Hua III, p. 202). So it appears as though the noema is, indeed, "immanent" in some sense. But we can now ask, in which sense—genuinely or phenomenologically? In reply,

[13] The rule seems to be this. Genuine immanence implies phenomenological immanence; but the converse is not the case. Perceptual objects can be phenomenologically immanent without being genuinely immanent. Phenomenological transcendence implies genuine transcendence. Nothing can be phenomenologically transcendent and genuinely immanent. However, the converse is not the case: genuine transcendence does not imply phenomenological immanence, for perceptual objects are genuinely transcendent yet phenomenologically immanent.

Husserl immediately adds: “on the other hand, however, this noema with its ‘tree’ in quotation marks is *no more genuinely inherent* in the experience than the actual tree” (Ibid.). So the noema is *phenomenologically* immanent but *not* genuinely immanent. Summarizing later in *Ideas* I, Husserl writes: “The noematic thus distinguishes itself *as a peculiar objectivity that nevertheless belongs to consciousness*” (Hua III, p. 265; my italics). Hence, the immanence of the noema as motivation for the mediator-interpretation is defused.

Nevertheless, the passages in support of phenomenological immanence definitely suggest some kind of part-whole inherence relationship between, respectively, the objects of perception and the perceiver’s consciousness. Now, I want to make clear that, even though I borrow the phrase “phenomenological immanence” from Crowell to talk about my (1.1), nowhere in Crowell (2008) is there the claim that perceptual objects are a part of or inhere in the perceiver’s consciousness. Crowell’s project is to rescue Husserl from mentalist interpretations of the (1.4)-kind that would have him zip up the world into some mental bubble. So Crowell’s emphasis is on that phenomenological immanence, as opposed to genuine immanence, “makes room for something like externalist intuitions” (Crowell 2008, p. 346). And at face value, reading “phenomenological immanence” as that objects can become a part of consciousness certainly sounds a lot like that objects are just mental representations. Hence Crowell’s emphasis that what is phenomenologically immanent may be external to the mind.

On the other hand, Drummond comes very close to (1.1), but never explicitly states it; e.g., he claims that Husserl denies “the absolute transcendence of the perceived object over perception” (1990, p. 153). He comes even closer when he writes that, for

Husserl, the "*intended object* itself *qua intended* is (intentionally) *contained within* transcendental subjectivity" (p. 252; my italics); which is a view echoed more recently like this: "Husserl insists that the reduction makes possible conceiving transcendental subjectivity as *inclusive* not only of the really inherent components of the experience *but of its object as well*" (Drummond 2008, p. 199; my italics). I take both Crowell and Drummond to be coping with the pressures of passages in Husserl like those above, which encourage (1.1) that perceptual objects are immanent to consciousness.

3. *A defense of phenomenological immanence*

Let me now dispel the paradoxical appearance of insisting on the phenomenological immanence of (1.1) while admitting that the intentional object must be transcendent to any particular intentional experience. What is needed to resolve this paradoxical appearance is some unified sense of consciousness that, as some whole, is phenomenologically (thus conceptually) distinct from the multitude of individual experiences that are its phenomenological parts. It seems to be of some such phenomenological unity that Husserl claims (1.1). Call the claim of such phenomenological unity, *phenomenological holism*.

During the period of the first edition of *Logical Investigations*, Husserl had been Humean about personal identity.[14] Consequently, he cut up consciousness to track discrete tokens of experience. Call this approach, *phenomenological atomism*. On this view, seeing at t1 the bowl of a spoon constitutes its own discrete bubble of

[14] Of the numerically identical "pure ego" required by neo-Kantians like Paul Natorp, Husserl writes: "I must openly admit that I have not in any way been able to find such a primitive ego as the necessary center of relations" (Hua XIX, p. 374).

consciousness that is numerically different from that of seeing at t2 the back of the same spoon. Over a period of time, then, the perceiver's mind would turn out to be a bubble bath of numerically diverse phenomenological atoms. In the first edition of *Logical Investigations*, Husserl describes such a Humean mind as the "combined phenomenological stock of the spiritual self (consciousness = the phenomenological self as 'bundle' or nexus of mental experiences)" (Hua XIX, p. 356). However, by the period of *Ideas* I, Husserl reversed his position about personal identity.[15] In *Ideas* I, Husserl is explicit about his commitment to the so-called "pure ego," which is "something fundamentally necessary and absolutely identical over all actual and potential changes in lived experiences" (Hua III, p. 109). It is by virtue of this *permanently* identical self that the plurality over time of my numerically discrete intentional experiences become combined into "*one* stream of lived experiences," (Zahavi 2005, p. 132) a trans-temporally unified consciousness. Dan Zahavi calls this permanently identical self "the *invariant* dimension of first-personal givenness" that is irreducible to any token intentional experience (Ibid.).

To encourage at least partial endorsement of something like the pure ego, let me simply appeal to intuition of phenomenological unity vague enough to resist challenge by the skeptic. Notice that even the Humean Husserl makes such a concession: the phenomenological self is somehow "*combined*." For instance, you're at a ballgame, you focus on the player at bat, feel the tension of suspense, then zoom out to capture the pitch then feel relief that the batter has struck out, hear the roar of the fans wash over you, giddily raise the cup of beer to your lips, feel the plastic rim over which drains the last bit

[15] In the second edition of *Logical Investigations*, Husserl remarks in a footnote: "Since then, I have learned how to find [the pure ego]" (Hua XIX, p. 374).

of the now lukewarm, bitter liquid. There is an unmistakable sense that these discrete phenomenological bubbles of experience belong together, that they have something in common with each other. The ready answer to what that common factor may be is that they are all *your* experiences. By contrast, if you mutated into a new self from experience to experience, that sense of unity would be lost. There would then be no causal (or, as Husserl prefers, "motivated") connection between feeling tension, the sense of relief and the taste of beer in celebration of the strike out. So if there is such a unity of otherwise diverse experiences, there must be something distinct from those experiences, the self—something like the "pure ego." In this sense, the self is genuinely transcendent to any of its experiences. The self is not a part of any of its experiences.

Despite its genuine transcendence to any of its experiences, Husserl also insists that the pure ego "offers itself with a peculiar transcendence, a *transcendence in immanence*" (Hua III, pp. 109-110). Again, we must rely on Crowell's distinction to avoid the appearance of double-talk: the self is genuinely transcendent but phenomenologically immanent. In a manuscript from the early 1920s, Husserl distinguishes the pure ego, which "is nothing other than a featureless pole of acts… an abstractly identical something" from consciousness—or, in his idiom of this period, "monad"—"that continuously bears within itself the absolutely identical ego-pole" (Hua XIV, p. 43). The self, which is genuinely transcendent, is nevertheless immanent to the phenomenological whole.

By analogy, think of the self as the string of a necklace and the experiences as the beads that it holds together. Without the string, there is no whole of the necklace. And the string is not a part of—i.e., "immanent" to—any of the beads. Should the string be cut at

the ends of each bead to make that segment a part of the bead, the beads would disperse and the necklace will disappear. But the string isn't just the necklace either: it is, like one of the beads, a mere part of the necklace; but it is a part of a different functional kind than the beads. And should the necklace disappear, so would the string.

Although it is because of the common self that the diverse experiences cohere into a whole, the self cannot be identified with that whole. Over time, the phenomenological whole changes just because its constituent experiences change. So if the self were identical with the phenomenological whole, it would change along with it; but if it changes with its experiences, then it can't unite them. Therefore, either the self is entirely out of consciousness or the self can only be a part of consciousness. Husserl writes that the pure ego is immanent to consciousness "only in so far as the immediately, evidently ascertainable distinctiveness of the essence and co-givenness which pure consciousness requires, do we want the pure ego to count as phenomenologically given." Otherwise, the pure ego "should yield to the [phenomenological] exclusion" (Hua III, p. 110). That is, the pure ego just is that *sense* of phenomenological unity. There may be metaphysically more to it; for instance, it may turn out to be some bunch of neurons that cohere together into a similar pattern on a regular basis. Or, perhaps the ancients were right, there is some immutable soul-like substance. But such discovery falls out of phenomenological inquiry. So, as far as the phenomenology goes, the pure ego just is that subjective sense of phenomenological unity distinct from the phenomenological whole that it unites. I think it's this mutual dependence between the self and the consciousness unified by it that makes the self phenomenologically immanent—i.e., immanent to unified consciousness.

However, this subjective aspect of united consciousness is by itself insufficient to support (1.1) since (1.1) requires the entry of the object into consciousness. Although the bundle of experiences is now united by the self, since the genuine transcendence of any object to any of these experiences still holds, the phenomenological unity can remain devoid of any intentional object. Consider again Crowell's account, according to which the objects of empty beliefs—i.e., beliefs unsupported by intuition—are *not* phenomenologically immanent. And this is exactly right. My empty belief about Neptune does not invite Neptune into my consciousness. Neptune is phenomenologically transcendent. Only what is intuitively available—canonically, perceptually available—can enter my consciousness. Since a bundle of empty beliefs united by a self is readily conceivable, we can readily conceive of a phenomenological whole that features no object at all. For example, let an astronomer think about Neptune in a sensory deprivation chamber. For (1.1), therefore, what is needed is an additional, *object-centered* account.

That object-centered account, which Husserl addresses in his discussions of "adumbration" and "passive synthesis," mirrors almost exactly the subjective one. According to the object-centered account of phenomenological unity, objects can also unite your experiences about them. As I touched upon in Sect. 2, numerical identity of x appears sufficient for the genuine transcendence of x. So, just as the pure ego is genuinely transcendent by virtue of its numerical identity, if the perceptual object is also numerically identical, the perceptual object too must be genuinely transcendent. For the relevant sense of numerical identity and transcendence, Husserl offers the following example:

> Constantly seeing this table, going around it, my position in space changing as always, I am continually *aware* of the bodily presence of *this one and the same table*; and moreover, *the same table in itself remains thoroughly unchanged*. The table-perception is, however, steadily changing itself; it is a continuity of variegating perceptions. I close my eyes. My other senses are closed off to the table. Now I have of it no perception. I open my eyes and I have again the perception. The perception? Let's be more precise. What returns [i.e., the perception] is under no condition individually the same [perception]. *Only the table is the same*… (Hua III, pp. 74-75; my italics)

Accordingly, I undergo over some period of time the relevant plurality of numerically diverse experiences, all of which are about the same object, the table itself. But the table itself is no part of any of those experiences. Either you're not seeing the table at all or you are seeing the table *through* your experiences. Therefore, the table cannot be a part of or genuinely immanent to any of my experiences. Instead, the table is *genuinely* transcendent.

But what holds together these numerically diverse experiences in the perception of the numerically identical table? Surely it's not just the pure ego, since the pure ego holds together *all* of its experiences while typically only *some* of its experiences will be about the table. For instance, over some stretch of time, you feel tired, bored, you listen to some music, suffer from an allergic reaction, smell the neighbor's barbeque, and taste something metallic in your mouth. These diverse experiences have one thing in common: they are all *your* experiences. By virtue solely of this fact, they are united with each other.

Now consider the table in front of you: look at it and touch it while walking around it. Your perceptual experiences of the table are also united, but not solely by virtue of the fact that they are your experiences. In other words, if I had nothing to go on but subjective phenomenological unity, I couldn't tell the difference between this table and that chair. If not the self, what then holds together these numerically diverse experiences of the table? For the most obvious answer, Husserl advises we consult not the mind but the perceptual object instead, the table itself. The table itself combines my diverse experiences of it to appear as a discrete object in the phenomenological whole. It is strictly in this light that I propose to read passages like the following: "the noematic is the field of unities, the noetic that of 'constitutive' multiplicity" (Hua III, p. 207; see also Hua XI, pp. 317-326). And that's how the perceptual object enters your consciousness, as required by (1.1). As the unifier of your perceptual experiences of it, the table *itself* is *phenomenologically* immanent while remaining *genuinely* transcendent.

4. *Consciousness spatialized*

The object of perception is phenomenologically immanent as the unifier of the subject's diverse perceptual experiences of it. If we combine this insight from Sect. 3 with Husserl's robust realism about perception, spatialism should follow as the best interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology of perception.

In his realism about the objects of perception, the mature Husserl is avowedly anti-Kantian. Husserl writes:

> It is… a fundamental error to think that perception… does not reach the thing itself, that it should be some in-itself and that in its being in-itself it is not given to us… The thing in space, which we see, is what is perceived through all of its transcendence, what is phenomenologically given in its corporeality… The perception of things does not re-present [*vergegenwärtigt*] something non-present, as though it were a memory or a fantasy; it present, its grasps what is itself in its bodily presence… (Hua III, pp. 78-79).

For example, Husserl tells us, "I perceive the thing, the natural object, the tree there in the garden; that and nothing else is the actual object of the perception 'intention' " (Ibid., p. 186). In contrast, he says the assertion of some reality "outside of the world, the one spatiotemporal world that is established by our actual experiences, is demonstrably absurd" (Ibid., pp. 90-91).

Superficially, it may appear that Husserlian perceptual objects are like Kantian empirical objects. After all, Kant's empirical objects also appear in spacetime, as constrained by the sensory receptivity and cognitive spontaneity of the subject. However, Kant is indeed an idealist since, in his view, space and time are mind-dependent "forms of intuition" rather than properties and relations of the thing in-itself. Thus, Kant imposes a strict epistemological and ontological apartheid between the objects of experience and some inscrutable reality outside of spacetime. Since Husserl strenuously denies such an inscrutable "*Ansich-sein*" beyond the "one, actual spatiotemporal world," Husserlian perceptual objects are, therefore, precisely non-Kantian (Hua III, pp. 90-91, 280-281).

In light of this anti-Kantianism about perceptual objects, recall the following Husserlian requirements. First, on the standard interpretation that I endorse, the noema is some kind of intentional object. Second, the noema of perception is, in some sense, *immanent*. Thus the intentional object of perception is immanent. Third, given Husserl's anti-Brentanianism about intentional objects, the noema cannot be *genuinely* immanent. However, if it's possible for an intentional object to be genuinely *transcendent* yet *phenomenologically* immanent, then it's possible that the object of perception is phenomenologically immanent. The sense of consciousness as the unity of otherwise diverse experiences allows for the phenomenological immanence of the perceptual object. Although the perceptual object is not a part of any particular experience, the object may be a part of consciousness in the unified sense. What the introduction of Husserl's anti-Kantianism tells us is *not* that the perceptual object gains phenomenological immanence by virtue of its mental representation; instead, the object of perception is phenomenologically immanent by virtue of the spatialization of consciousness. In perceptual awareness, consciousness takes up that intersubjectively common, external space occupied by the physical objects of perception.

In the 1920s, Husserl introduces a rather eccentric conception of the Leibnizian term "monad." Most famously, in the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl describes the monad "as the ego regarded in full concretion" (Hua I, p. 102). We should not, however, be distracted by the terminological novelty. By "monad," Husserl means roughly what, in *Ideas* I, he means by "pure consciousness" or the "phenomenological residuum." First, prior to examining the abstract and generic features of consciousness (in what Husserl calls "eidetic analysis"), consciousness is characterized in *Ideas* I as "individual" and

"concrete" (Hua III, pp. 58, 71). Second, in a manuscript dated June 1921, Husserl equates the monad with the "residuum of the phenomenological reduction" (Hua XIV, p. 52). According to Hiroshi Kojima: "In the later Husserl, the phenomenological reduction always already means a reduction to the monad" (Kojima 2000, p. 184). Finally, we should draw no hasty exegetical conclusions from the fact that the monad should be some kind of "ego." In particular, we would err in thinking that the monad is some variation of the pure ego. In *Ideas* I, Husserl distinguishes pure consciousness from pure ego, since the latter is some abstract, numerically identical feature of an otherwise ever changing concrete consciousness (Hua III, pp. 58, 109-110). Just so, the later Husserl distinguishes sharply between the pure ego and the monad. The pure ego "is nothing other than the bare pole of acts… something abstractly identical" (Hua XIV, p. 43). By contrast, the monad is the "concrete self" that "bears within itself the absolutely identical ego-pole" (Ibid.). So the pure ego is a part of the monad but not exhaustive of it. In *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl writes: "We distinguish the ego regarded in full concretion"—i.e., monad—"from the ego as identical pole" (Hua I, p. 102). In this light, I consider the later Husserl's "monadology" as simply a continuation of his discussion of "pure consciousness" from the period of *Ideas* I.

And of the monad, Husserl writes that it is comprised of the ego that "through its consciousness, is related to 'actualities,' to a surrounding world [*Umwelt*] in the widest sense." However, he adds, "this surrounding world is *immanent*, insofar as immanent objects are constituted by virtue of intentionality" (XIV, p. 47; my italics). Similarly, in the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl claims that, in some sense, "nature" itself can be regarded as a part of my monad—and, thus, as a part of my consciousness (Hua I, pp.

127-136). I take passages like these to be an echo of the following from *Ideas* I: "phenomenology, in fact, extends over the entire natural world" (Hua III, pp. 302-303; see also 142-143). Again, if the purview of phenomenology is restricted to what is immanent to consciousness, and the natural world now belongs within the purview of phenomenology, the natural world must be in some sense immanent to consciousness.

Now, as Dummett (1993) warns (pp. 76-77), at this point it may appear as though the world has been sucked up into a kind of mental bubble to float away into the philosophical vacuum of some absolute idealism. However, this familiar stereotype about the Husserlian view overlooks Husserl's anti-Kantianism about perceptual objects. Throughout *Ideas* I, Husserl repeatedly insists on (1.2), the intersubjective identity of perceptual objects. For instance, if a group of people is sharing the same environment, any object in that environment will be "given intersubjectively and identified as objectively the same actuality" (Hua III, p. 279). And it is this intersubjective identity of worldly objects that allows any "plurality of subjects to stand in 'agreement' " with one another about the world (Ibid, p. 317). Even in the later writings, in some of which he appears to flirt with some sort of idealism, Husserl is insistent: the surrounding world that is immanent to some particular consciousness is, nevertheless, the "numerically identically the same nature" that is accessible to anyone (Hua XIV, pp. 249, 267, 276, 287, 289). Regardless of their immanence, in other words, perceptual objects remain intersubjectively identical: any worldly object that "can be cognized by one ego must, in principle, be cognizable by any ego" (Hua III, p. 90). The ready explanation of this intersubjective accessibility is Husserl's anti-Kantianism about perceptual objects.

Objects of perception take up intersubjective space. So, if the objects of perception are phenomenologically immanent, perceptual consciousness must also take up space.

By contrast, Husserl warns against the following. To regard the world as immanent to consciousness while giving up on its intersubjective identity would yield what Husserl describes in *Crisis* as "the paradox of human subjectivity." On this paradox, "the subjective part of the world swallows up, so to speak, the entire world and therewith itself" (Hua VI, p. 183). Since you are a part of the world, to suck up the world into your mental bubble would entail swallowing yourself; but the self that has been swallowed up is itself a mental bubble with its own world. Thereby, you wind up generating an infinite regress of mental bubbles within mental bubbles. And I take this to be Husserl's argument *against* any facile idealism.

Nevertheless, Husserl does identify himself as a *transcendental* idealist. However, what should be clear by now is that Husserl's transcendental idealism cannot be the Kantian sort. Most crucially, unlike Kant, space in Husserl is not mind-dependent: space is no form of intuition that imposes Kant's strict apartheid between the empirical object and some thing in-itself. If Husserl does not believe that perceptual objects are mental representations—either as genuinely immanent or through some mind-dependent form of intuition—in what sense can he be considered a "transcendental idealist"?

Husserlian phenomenology is obviously a subject-centered philosophical account of the world. What makes the phenomenology of the mature Husserl such a sharp departure from that tradition, which begins with Descartes and culminates in Kant, is that the subject is *not* identified as either exhaustively or even essentially *mental*, in whichever sense that would preclude non-Kantian realism about space. To be sure, on

Husserlian phenomenology, what is essential to any subject is its consciousness. However, as we just saw, Husserlian consciousness can take up space in the sense of space occupied by any garden-variety physical object. In this light, let any subject-centered philosophical account, which insists on subjective constraints as necessary for the appearance of the physical world, be dubbed "transcendental." Further, let any philosophical account restricted to the contents and features of consciousness be dubbed "idealism." It should then follow that Husserlian phenomenology is, indeed, a kind of "transcendental idealism." However, since Husserlian consciousness can take up physical space, this kind of "idealism" does not preclude what would otherwise be identified as realism. Certainly, it is not the kind of idealism that draws metaphysical substance from the Cartesian tradition.

Even though in perception the subject can access the perceptual object itself, the appearance of the perceptual object is nevertheless constrained by various relevant subjective features and properties. Take a cylindrical tube, like that found at the center of a roll of paper towel, and peer through it. By comparison to unhindered visual experience, what you find through the tube is informationally impoverished: your visual field is narrowed and, depending on size and distance, you may have a more partial view of F than you would have in unhindered visual experience. And this example points to a fact about your ordinary perceptual experience: that it too is constrained by, for instance, the location of your body relative to the location of F, the kinesthetic limitations of your body, whatever perceptual abnormalities you may suffer (e.g., that your are color blind), lighting conditions, sensory modality (i.e., that you are seeing F rather than touching F), etc. By virtue of the fact that F can only appear to you under such constraints, the

appearance of any perceptual object will entail these limitations. In other words, "transcendental idealism" in the relevant sense seems to be the view that the world can appear only as constrained by the psycho-physical conditions of some perceiving subject. Or, as Husserl himself puts it in somewhat stronger language: "According to transcendental idealism: nature is inconceivable without co-existent subjects that can enjoy possible experiences of it [i.e., nature]" (Hua XXXVI, p. 156).

As a consequence of the subject's bodily location in the world, Husserl writes, "the thing of perception is always given in a certain orientation" (Hua XXXVI, p. 93; see also, pp. 133, 192). He continues:

> Thus in perception appears some thing, but by its essence the thing appears only superficially, and only through the sides of the surfaces and qualitative determinations, which belong to this side and to that orientation. It lies in the essence of perception that it signifies in itself, so to speak, more to grasp than it, in fact, grasps… In the 'sense' of perception the thing is not just the front-side; it is a full thing, it has its back-sides, its interior, etc. (Hua XXXVI, p. 95)

This "orientation" is a function of how the perceiving subject is related to the perceptual object. What's required for this sort of relationship, Husserl writes, "is an actual subject" that "belongs to the world itself," such that "a material world is only conceivable as a psycho-physical world: as a world that includes [some] organic, human entity" (Hua XXXVI, p. 138). That is because the perceived object is spatial (Hua XXXVI, p. 102). However, it would be incoherent for the perceiving subject to be no less spatial than the

object she perceives. Thus the perceiving subject, as "Leibkörper," must also take up space (Ibid., pp. 133, 136). Given this spatial relationship between perceiver and object, as well as the psycho-physical constraints that impose further limits on the relationship, typically only the "surfaces" of the perceptual object will appear. Any perceptual object will be, typically, more than any of its surfaces; e.g., a house will not just be its front-side. Nevertheless, it is the actual surface of the object itself that appears and not some mental, non-spatial representation of it. To accommodate such a spatial surface as immanent to consciousness, consciousness must thus be spatialized.

5. *Conclusion*

According to Husserl, the noema of perception is, in some sense, immanent to consciousness. On the standard interpretation that I endorse, the noema is some kind of intentional object. So the intentional object, in some sense, must be immanent to consciousness. However, Husserl is consistently anti-Brentanian in the following respect: no intentional object is genuinely immanent to any particular intentional act. So, either Husserl contradicts himself or there is some ambiguity to be resolved. The relevant ambiguity is resolved by distinguishing between *genuine* immanence and *phenomenological* immanence. The noema of perception is *genuinely* transcendent but *phenomenologically* immanent. It is not immanent to any particular intentional act, but it is immanent to consciousness conceived in the unified sense. In the unified sense, consciousness is the unity of diverse intentional and phenomenal episodes. The object of perception can be featured as a part of this phenomenological whole. The object is

immanently featured as a subsidiary unity within the subjective unity of consciousness. However, the conception of the perceptual object as some mental representation would violate Husserl's anti-Kantian realism about perception. Thus, for Husserl, the object of perception cannot be any mental representation. If the object of perception is no mental representation, how then can it be immanent to consciousness? That is, how can something that is inherently spatial be a part of consciousness? My reply is the spatialist interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology of perception. It seems that, during perceptual episodes, Husserlian consciousness takes up space, in the realist non-Kantian sense of space itself. The surface properties and features of the object itself, which are spatial, occupy the consciousness of the perceiving subject.

My spatialist interpretation of Husserl does not deny that there are phenomenal experiences, Erlebnisse, which are irreducible to the publicly accessible objects of perception. All Erlebnisse in Husserl are intrinsically private. During the period of the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl conceives of consciousness as exhausted by such intrinsically private states. Such a view may very well be construed as an internalist conception of consciousness. By the period of *Ideas* I, however, it seems Husserl expanded the notion of consciousness to be inclusive of actual perceptual objects, physical objects that take up space. But there is no reason to believe that Husserl thereby renounced the existence of Erlebnisse. Even during perceptual awareness, the Erlebnisse of retention and protention, not to mention hyletic data, are publicly inaccessible. However, as soon as Erlebnisse are identified as intrinsically "mental" in some sense that distinguishes Erlebnisse as metaphysically different in kind from the physical objects of perception, we relapse into that ancient confrontation between mind and body. By

contrast, without such a difference in metaphysical kind, the phenomenology of perception can conform to the intuition in (1.1) under a sense of "object" common to both (1.2) and (1.3).

A predictable objection to the spatialist interpretation of Husserl is to invoke some interpretation of the epoché, according to which the physical world is excluded from phenomenological consideration. Thus, the objection concludes, no physical object can be a part of consciousness and, therefore, the spatialist interpretation is wrong. My reply is that, first, there is no consensus interpretation of the epoché. So exegetical competition over the epoché remains open. And, second, spatialism itself implies a competing interpretation of the epoché. According to spatialism, we cannot make any positive judgments about the physical world other than what is intuitively accessible about it. But what is intuitively accessible about the physical world is that it takes up space. To then follow Kant by insisting on the mental nature of space is to violate the epoché at the other end, so to speak, with a positive metaphysical assertion about the nature of mental reality. If such positive metaphysical assertion about the nature of mental reality is also suspended then Husserl's conception of consciousness can conform to spatialist intuitions about the objects of perceptual awareness.

What is not intuitively accessible about the perceived world are the fundamental particles that make it up or the metaphysically deep nature of its causal transactions. The attempt to explain consciousness in terms of such theses of the natural sciences would be, indeed, a violation of the epoché. What is also intuitively inaccessible is the nature of such physical objects independent of any perceiving subject. If the aspiration of the natural sciences is an account of physical objects without reference to any perceiving

subject, then such an account must be bracketed by the epoché. Without recourse to such inscrutably absolute objective nature of the physical world, what remains are the physical objects as they appear to the perceiving subject. However, to insist that such perceived objects are anything other than the actual objects themselves would not only violate the bracketing of the physical sciences but also the bracketing of the psychological sciences. By contrast, on the interpretation of the epoché urged by my spatialist interpretation, allowing consciousness to consist of private Erlebnisse as well as the publicly accessible surface features of physical objects coheres not only with the intuition in (1.1) but also avoids submission to the general thesis of (1.4), thereby avoiding confrontation by the epoché.

Of a piece with the above objection is the following: how can consciousness be both mental and physical—does this not restore Cartesian dualism through a phenomenological backdoor? My reply is that this very objection presupposes metaphysical commitments about the mental and the physical that I suggest Husserl's epoché is intended to sidestep. Just as Husserl offers no metaphysically deep sense of the physical beyond what is intuitively accessible, the claim I suggest is that he offers no metaphysically deep sense of Erlebnisse either. Erlebnisse are private, but privacy entails no heavy-duty claim about its metaphysical nature. Wittgenstein's beetle in the box may only be privately accessible, but that doesn't mean that the beetle in the box is therefore mental. Husserl's claim seems to be just that both Erlebnisse and the objects of perception are available to phenomenological inquiry since they are both immanent to consciousness.

Finally, a further objection can be expected to my above reply: on the interpretation of the epoché I offer, the determination of consciousness is metaphysically too thin to be of any philosophical interest. After all, isn't the metaphysical determination of consciousness the very purpose of contemporary discussions in the philosophy of mind—i.e., is physicalism true or false? In this light, my interpretation of the epoché may appear to get Husserl out of the philosophy-of-mind business altogether, rendering him irrelevant to the contemporary debate. But this objection seems to lend too much credit to contemporary advocates of the kind of mentalism in (1.4). Physicalism remains attractive just because, thanks to the contemporary physical sciences, we do in fact have a robust sense of the physical world. We have, however, no such comparably robust sense of "the mental" that is in any way superior to the sort of recourse to intuitions that Husserl has on offer. Erlebnisse may be private and immediately accessible. But neither property yields any substantive claims about the metaphysical nature of Erlebnisse. Again, privacy is an epistemological property and not a metaphysical one. And, according to spatialism, immediate accessibility fails to even epistemologically distinguish Erlebnisse from physical objects; for, on spatialism, the surfaces of physical objects should also be immediately accessible.

But what about the argument from quasi-perceptions, like fantasy, dreams, illusions and hallucinations? Aren't such quasi-perceptions canonical of intrinsically mental states, such that they constitute a sharp metaphysical line between the mental and the physical? And yet, for the subject who suffers them, such quasi-perceptions may be introspectively indistinguishable from actual perceptual episodes. Does that fact not urge precisely the sort of mentalism about consciousness in (1.4)? The spatialist reply is that

such introspective indiscriminability is an *epistemological* failure that warrants no metaphysical conclusion. Husserl does not deny the existence of such quasi-perceptions. Indeed, for Husserl some such quasi-perception plays an integral role in long-term, "adumbrative" perceptual episodes: it is the stuff of protentions and retentions. But what metaphysical claim can be made about them? We can't even claim that they are not spatial. Presumably, such quasi-perceptions exist inside the head. But your head is literally inside spacetime, along with all other perceivable objects. Thus quasi-perceptions must also exist in space. If anything existing in spacetime must be physical, we then have some reason to determine quasi-perceptions as physical. By contrast, even denying the physicalist antecedent about spatial entities does not yield the denial that quasi-perceptions are physical. Instead, the denial of the antecedent simply brings us to that metaphysical no-man's land where, as always, we are left wondering what other kind of thing the mind may be.

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